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Abstract: 
After exchanges and alternative trading venues have introduced electronic execution 
mechanisms worldwide, the focus of the securities trading industry shifted to the use of fully 
electronic trading engines by banks, brokers and their institutional customers. These 
Algorithmic Trading engines enable order submissions without human intervention based on 
quantitative models applying historical and real-time market data. Although there is a 
widespread discussion on the pros and cons of Algorithmic Trading and on its impact on 
market volatility and market quality, little is known on how algorithms actually place their 
orders in the market and whether and in which respect this differs form other order 
submissions. Based on a dataset that – for the first time – includes a specific flag to enable the 
identification of orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading engines, the paper investigates the 
extent of Algorithmic Trading activity and specifically their order placement strategies in 
comparison to human traders in the Xetra trading system. It is shown that Algorithmic 
Trading has become a relevant part of overall market activity and that Algorithmic Trading 
engines fundamentally differ from human traders in their order submission, modification and 
deletion behavior as they exploit real-time market data and latest market movements. 
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IT has triggered a significant transformation in securities trading: The electronification of market 
venues in Europe, i.e. exchange trading systems like Xetra (Deutsche Börse), SETS (London Stock 
Exchange) or NSC (Euronext Paris) took place in the late 1990s and enabled market participants 
(banks, brokers as well as their institutional and retail customers) to access electronic order books via 
remote access without the need for physical presence on an exchange floor. Now, a second electronic 
revolution in securities trading is taking place (Preuss 2007): market participants along the value chain 
started an arms race by automating their trading processes, specifically by applying Algorithmic 
Trading. Definitions of Algorithmic Trading conceptualize it as the general “use of computer 
algorithms to manage the trading process” (Hendershot et al. 2008, p.1) or as the “computerized 
execution of financial instruments following pre-specified rules and guidelines” (Kissel & Malamut 
2006, p.12). Gomber & Gsell (2006, p.541) define it as a technology that “emulates a broker’s core 
competence of slicing a big order into a multiplicity of smaller orders and of timing these orders to 
minimize market impact via electronic means”. These algorithms determine ex ante or continuously 
the optimum volume of the (next) order slice and its time of submission to the market based on 
mathematical models and considering historical and real-time market data.  
For Algorithmic Trading engines, speed of execution, availability of real-time market data and 
minimum latency have become key success factors as already milliseconds can make a difference. As 
the speed of data communication is limited by the speed of light, the best option for minimizing 
latency is to get physically closer to the market. Market operators therefore offer co-location services 
where market participants can place their trading servers adjacent to the technical infrastructure of the 
market itself and thus ensure low latency (a latency measurement methodology has been proposed by 
Budimir & Schweickert (2007)). The downside of this development for market operators is that they 
have to cope with increasing demands for speed and growing amounts of data and message traffic, i.e. 
higher investments to upgrade their infrastructure especially for peak loads. The load on market 
operators’ systems is steadily increasing as “Algorithmic Trading is the fastest growing source of 
order flow” (Preuss 2007, p.154). However, there is only little academic work on how Algorithmic 
Trading engines schedule their trading strategies and adapt their behavior to current market 
movements and whether or to which extent it is different to the trading behavior of (human) traders. 
Based on a unique dataset that encompasses all order book activity in the 30 most liquid shares traded 
on Xetra, the electronic trading system of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, this research aims at 
demonstrating the manifest differences in the order submission and deletion behavior of Algorithmic 
Trading engines versus other order flow submitters. This is facilitated as the dataset enables to 
distinguish between orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading systems and orders submitted by 
humans. In particular, differences in the order submission strategies and order aggressiveness as well 
as concerning update/deletion strategies are disclosed. In the following section 2, related work on 
Algorithmic Trading is discussed. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the underlying Xetra trading 
system and market model and describes the available dataset. Section 4 presents the results obtained 
while the final section concludes and gives an outlook on future research in this field. 
2  RELATED WORK 
Algorithmic Trading systems typically aim at achieving or beating a specified benchmark with their 
executions and may be distinguished by their underlying benchmark, their aggressiveness or trading 
style as well as their adaptation behavior (Kissel & Malamut 2006). The volume-weighted average 
price (VWAP), which is calculated as the ratio of the value traded and the volume traded within a 
specified time horizon, commonly serves as a benchmark for (automated) trading (Domowitz & 
Yegerman 2005). The universe of possible strategies has been narrowed down to the efficient frontier 
 of optimal trading strategies (Almgren & Chriss 2000, Almgren & Lorenz 2007). There is evidence 
that strategies that are adaptive to market developments, i.e. that can vary their aggressiveness, are 
superior to static strategies (Almgren & Chriss 2000). Furthermore, Algorithmic Trading systems must 
avoid to be detected as this leaked information could be exploited by other market participants 
(Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2005). Research on aggressiveness of orders in general is given by 
Ranaldo (2004) who investigated how (human) traders adapt their behavior to changes in the order 
book. Empirical research found the execution quality of algorithms to be inferior to executions 
handled by a broker. Nevertheless, this underperformance can be overcompensated by the fact that 
algorithms are offered at lower fees than human order handling (Domowitz & Yegerman 2005) as no 
(expensive) human traders are involved. Due to the increased cost consciousness among market 
participants, algorithms have become an attractive alternative. 
Little research is available that deals with the behavior of Algorithmic Trading systems and their 
impact on the market itself. Hendershot et al. (2008) showed that Algorithmic Trading has a positive 
impact on liquidity, while Gsell (2008) found evidence that it has potential to lower market volatility. 
Datasets similar to the one used for the research at hand have been analyzed by Prix et al. (2007) and 
(2008). The former analyzes the lifetime distribution of cancelled orders and finds systematic patterns, 
while the latter investigates cancellation and re-insertion structures in the Xetra order flow. The main 
distinction to those datasets and the novelty of the dataset used for this research is the information 
whether an order event was submitted by an Algorithmic Trading system or a human trader.  
3  XETRA TRADING SYSTEM AND AVAILABLE DATA SET 
3.1  Xetra – The electronic trading system of Deutsche Börse AG 
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, operated by Deutsche Börse AG, has launched the fully-electronic 
exchange trading system Xetra in 1997. It offers a range of market models that address different asset 
classes as well as securities with differing liquidity. For high-liquid shares Xetra offers the market 
model continuous trading. Continuous trading starts after an opening call auction and can be 
interrupted by one or several intraday call auctions. The trading day ends with a closing call auction.  
For securities in the DAX30 index that constitutes the dataset of this research the timing is as follows: 
At 08:50 the call phase of the opening auction starts. In the call phase, the order book is partially open, 
as information about the indicative auction price and indicative volume (the volume and price at which 
executions would take place if the call phase would end instantaneously) or best bid and asks and their 
volumes are disseminated. Instantly after the end of the call phase, the auction price is determined 
according to the principle of most executable volume (Schwartz & Francioni 2004). All auction call 
phases feature a predefined length plus a random end of at most 30 seconds. This means, that for all 
DAX30 securities the price of the opening auction is determined between 09:00:00 and 09:00:30. 
After the opening auction, continuous trading starts and for each order immediately upon entry it is 
checked whether it is executable against orders on the other side of the order book. If no execution is 
possible or the order was not completely executed, the order is stored in the order book according to 
price-time priority. During continuous trading the order book is open, i.e. the limits, the accumulated 
volume per limit and the number of orders per limit are displayed. For DAX30 securities, an intraday 
call auction interrupts continuous trading at 13:00. After the auction, continuous trading resumes until 
it is ended by the closing auction which starts at 17:30.  
To ensure price continuity, continuous trading may be contingently interrupted by volatility 
interruptions. In case the next potential price lies outside pre-defined price ranges, a volatility 
interruption stops continuous trading for an additional unscheduled call auction.  
To submit their trading intentions, market participants use market orders or limit orders. Market orders 
are unlimited buy or sell orders. They are to be executed at the next price determined. Limit orders are 
 buy or sell orders, which are to be executed at their specified limit or better. The buy limit order with 
the highest limit and the sell limit order with the lowest limit in the order book define the spread of the 
market. A buy (sell) limit order that is immediately executable due to a limit equal to or higher (lower) 
than the current best offer (bid) is also called “marketable limit order” as its result equals the result of 
a market order, i.e. immediate execution. Therefore, market orders and limit orders that trigger 
immediate executions are called aggressive (or submitted by an aggressor), whilst limit orders that are 
not immediately executable and that are positioned in the order book are called non-aggressive (or 
submitted by a non-aggressor). An iceberg order is a hidden order type specified by a limit, an overall 
volume and a peak volume. The peak is the visible part of an iceberg and is introduced into the order 
book according to price-time priority. In continuous trading, as soon as the peak has been completely 
executed and hidden volume is still available a new peak is entered into the book. In auction trading, 
iceberg orders contribute with their overall volume. Furthermore, market-to-limit orders can be 
applied, but they are seldomly used and therefore not relevant for the analysis below (for further 
information on order types and the market model for equity trading see Deutsche Börse 2004). 
3.2  Properties of the dataset 
The blue-chip index DAX30 comprises the 30 largest and most actively traded companies that are 
listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. For these securities in 2007, 98% of the order book turnover 
on German Exchanges was executed on the Xetra trading system (Deutsche Börse AG 2007). The 
dataset provided by Deutsche Börse AG encompasses all Xetra order book events for the DAX30 
securities within the week from October 8
th to 12
th, 2007 comprising of in total 9,036,638 events and 
593,857 trades with an overall value of 33,094,131,632.72 € in continuous trading and in auctions. For 
each single order book event a code is given that specifies the type of event that occurred. 46.6% of 
the events are order insertions, 0.9% are modifications, 34.6% are deletions (the number of 
modifications is low compared to the number of deletions because in the Xetra trading system only a 
reduction of the order’s volume leads to a modification event retaining the time-stamp as it does not 
affect price-time priority, while all other changes in order parameters are mapped to a deletion event 
and a subsequent submission event of a ‘new’ (the modified) order applying a new timestamp). 11% 
of the events are full executions and 5.9% represent partial executions. The remaining 1% consist of 
other primarily technical events that are not relevant for the analysis. Each event is assigned a 
timestamp, identifiers for the affected securities and orders, characteristics of the order and event-
specific fields, e.g. a price for an execution. The given timestamps have a precision of 1/100 second. 
What makes the available dataset unique is an additional flag in the data that indicates whether the 
submitter of the order event has been an algorithm. As an order can only be modified by the submitter, 
all events corresponding to the same order will have the same flag, i.e. an order is either an 
Algorithmic Trading order or not. Deutsche Börse AG offers a special pricing model, the so-called 
Automated Trading Program (ATP), which charges a lower fee for automated trading. The exchange 
defines ATP transactions as “all transactions that have been generated by an electronic system of 
either the ATP member or the ATP member’s clients, whereby the electronic system has to determine 
two out of the three following order parameters: price (order type and/or order limit where applicable), 
timing (time of order entry) and quantity (quantity of the order in number of securities)” (Deutsche 
Börse AG 2008, p.1). In this program, depending on the accumulated monthly ATP volume per ATP 
member, a marginal rebate of up to 60% of trading fees applies. To qualify for fee reductions offered 
by ATP, a member’s trading process has to fulfill some prerequisites. The thereby generated orders 
have to be channeled directly into the Xetra system without further manual intervention. To enable the 
application of lower trading fees the ATP orders furthermore must be submitted using a designated 
ATP Trader-ID. All order events that were submitted using such an ATP Trader-ID are tagged in the 
available data set. As the tag is anonymous it just gives the information whether this order event is an 
ATP event or not. It is not possible to pin down behavior to a specific ATP Trader-ID or to directly 
determine whether two different orders have been submitted by the same market participant or not. 
 The requirements set by Deutsche Börse to qualify for ATP shall ensure that the users are machines, 
i.e. Algorithmic Traders. However, it cannot be ensured that vice versa all machines make actually use 
of the ATP fee rebate, i.e. an event not flagged as an ATP event (in the following: Non-ATP) may still 
have been submitted by an algorithm. Though, given that the lower fees of ATP constitute a truth-
telling incentive for market participants, one can assume the accuracy of the ATP flag to be very high.  
4  RESULTS – STRATEGIES OF ALGORITHMIC TRADING 
ENGINES VERSUS HUMAN TRADERS 
The analysis targets at comparing the trading strategies of Algorithmic Trading engines and human 
traders in several dimensions and to answer the following research questions in this context: 
1.  What is the overall extent of Algorithmic Trading activity relative to human traders’ activity? 
2.  Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading 
engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market movements and 
market information when algorithms execute orders aggressively? 
3.  Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by Algorithmic Trading 
engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market movements and 
market information when algorithms position non-aggressive orders in the order book?  
The focus for the analysis of the research questions is laid on the continuous trading phases as auctions 
with their call phases of up to ten minutes without any executions exhibit a different trading behavior. 
The volumes executed in auctions would distort the time-series analysis as they concentrate large 
execution volumes at a single point of time. Within the dataset 13.4% of overall executed shares 
(volume) are executed in call auctions, representing 14.0% of the total traded value (in €). These 
figures include call auctions triggered by volatility interruptions. Within the observation period, five 
volatility interruptions occurred in different securities executing a total of 46,068 shares representing 
less than 0.01% of the overall value traded. The analysis of Algorithmic Trading behavior in auctions 
will be subject to future research. Therefore, the results presented here refer to continuous trading that 
represents 97% of the overall trading time. 
Research question 1: What is the overall extent of Algorithmic Trading activity relative to human 
traders’ activity? 
The activity of ATP traders can be analyzed from two perspectives. On the one hand there is the sheer 
amount of events (traffic on the electronic trading system) that can be analyzed comparing ATP and 
Non-ATP events. On the other hand, the focus may be laid on the actual executions by algorithms, i.e. 
the trading activity, rather than on the mere technical events. Table 1 summarizes the events (see the 
first two columns for ATP and Non-ATP) and actual executions (see columns 3 to 6 for ATP and Non-
ATP) occurring during continuous trading per security. It shows that Algorithmic Trading constitutes a 
relevant part of overall system traffic and also of actual trading activity. In the observation period, the 
overall share of ATP events is 52.3% and for only five out of the 30 securities the share of ATP events 
is below 50%. Fresenius Medical Care with 69.0% has the highest rate of ATP events while 
Volkswagen  has the lowest rate (35.8%). Concerning the actual execution events, i.e. partial or 
complete executions, ATP has a share of 54.7% whereby Linde has the highest rate of ATP execution 
events with 65.0% while Deutsche Telekom has the lowest with 42.9%. The value associated with 
ATP trading is 43.0% on average for all securities. As execution events are considered in Table 1, the 
traded value is double-counted; once for the buyer and once for the seller. 52.7% of the orders entered 
during continuous trading are ATP orders. ATP and Non-ATP submission exhibit a similar share of 
aggressive orders (ATP: 14.6%; Non-ATP: 11.2%) (order data not shown additionally in Table 1 to 
assure readability). 
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 In the following a deeper analysis distinguishing aggressor and non-aggressor orders is performed: If 
aggressive executions are considered (Table 2), in total 56% of all aggressive executions are triggered 
by an ATP order as the aggressor. Linde has the highest share of ATP executions as in 68.4% an ATP 
trader was the aggressor. Further E.ON catches attention, as about two out of three executions were 
triggered by ATP orders, which sum up to 63.6% of the total value traded. For Deutsche Post only 
30.5% of the executed value has been triggered by aggressive ATP orders. Please note that for the 
execution perspective of aggressors, the traded value is only single-counted.    
  
ATP Aggressor  Non-ATP Aggressor  Instrument 
#Exec. Share  Value  (€)  Share  #Exec. Share  Value  (€)  Share 
Adidas 5,871  51.8% 147,727,670 40.1%  5,463 48.2%  220,465,985 59.9% 
Allianz 17,939  58.3% 815,830,769 54.6%  12,850 41.7%  677,666,105 45.4% 
BASF 12,284  63.6% 484,743,607 54.8%  7,020 36.4%  399,148,772 45.2% 
Bayer 14,661  59.1% 527,693,979 45.5%  10,158 40.9%  631,532,720 54.5% 
BMW 7,759  54.4% 238,952,064 46.7%  6,509 45.6%  272,935,985 53.3% 
Commerzbank 10,674  47.3% 378,816,418 33.4%  11,890 52.7%  754,370,222 66.6% 
Continental 7,428  50.9% 203,448,578 39.6%  7,164 49.1%  310,383,456 60.4% 
Daimler 22,544  58.5% 1,175,580,710 50.1%  15,974 41.5%  1,172,049,546 49.9% 
Deutsche Bank  17,440  54.1% 928,326,908 49.2%  14,777 45.9%  957,613,348 50.8% 
Deutsche Börse  13,079  55.1% 469,338,882 42.2%  10,663 44.9%  643,135,171 57.8% 
Deutsche Post  6,329  45.1% 262,851,251 30.5%  7,707 54.9%  599,295,719 69.5% 
Deutsche Postbank  4,343  54.5% 91,187,404 44.7%  3,622 45.5%  112,663,825 55.3% 
Deutsche Telekom  8,217  47.7% 520,195,714 34.1%  9,007 52.3%  1,005,149,069 65.9% 
E.ON 17,075  66.0% 868,643,705 63.6%  8,792 34.0%  498,175,815 36.4% 
Fresenius Med. Care  4,930  57.1% 79,234,895 52.7%  3,704 42.9%  71,045,150 47.3% 
Henkel 4,603  44.7% 95,672,277 36.8%  5,688 55.3%  164,456,873 63.2% 
Hypo Real Estate  7,587  50.5% 172,726,254 39.6%  7,438 49.5%  263,415,025 60.4% 
Infineon 6,232  53.1% 230,418,056 39.8%  5,512 46.9%  349,128,733 60.2% 
Linde 7,916  68.4% 179,499,154 59.8%  3,651 31.6%  120,725,624 40.2% 
Lufthansa 8,285  65.6% 207,102,360 55.3%  4,337 34.4%  167,104,966 44.7% 
MAN 10,385  50.6% 321,400,018 39.4%  10,159 49.4%  494,482,872 60.6% 
Merck 6,132  58.0% 153,803,815 43.8%  4,448 42.0%  197,056,651 56.2% 
Metro 4,890  57.5% 122,000,709 44.6%  3,613 42.5%  151,714,068 55.4% 
Münchner Rück  13,263  64.5% 496,915,991 57.4%  7,313 35.5%  369,170,149 42.6% 
RWE 13,280  63.4% 567,663,548 55.1%  7,671 36.6%  462,435,466 44.9% 
SAP 23,196  50.3% 1,116,400,830 41.2%  22,879 49.7%  1,593,677,930 58.8% 
Siemens 18,266  59.3% 1,002,700,087 56.4%  12,516 40.7%  773,706,990 43.6% 
ThyssenKrupp 9,446  59.7% 227,957,798 48.1%  6,368 40.3%  246,201,736 51.9% 
TUI 4,101  48.9% 92,710,494 37.2%  4,285 51.1%  156,649,695 62.8% 
Volkswagen 24,282  55.1% 934,060,563 38.2%  19,787 44.9%  1,508,144,901 61.8% 
Total 332,437  56.0% 13,113,604,506 46.1%  260,965 44.0%  15,343,702,566 53.9% 
Table 2.   Number of executions and executed value for ATP- and Non-ATP aggressors in 
continuous trading 
Table 2 further discloses that though across all securities 56.0% of all executions are triggered by 
aggressive ATP orders, they represent only 46.1% of the totally traded value. The average value per 
executed order for ATP aggressor executions is 39,447 € and the average value per executed order for 
Non-ATP aggressor executions is 58,796 €. There are two possible explanations:  
1)  ATP users have more partial executions   
A possible explanation for the fact that more executions result in less executed volume would be 
that aggressive Algorithmic Trading orders have more partial executions boosting their total 
 number of executions. If the algorithms submit orders that hit orders at several price levels, this 
would result in several executions and the value per execution would be lowered. 
However, this argument does not hold true. This can be checked by measuring the number of 
different timestamps for the respective executions as multiple executions at the same timestamp 
represent partial executions. As there are 332,437 ATP aggressor executions at only 278,374 
different timestamps, 19.4% of the aggressor orders seem to cause executions at several price 
levels. But for the Non-ATP aggressors there are 260,965 executions at 209,919 distinct 
timestamps indicating that 24.3% of Non-ATP aggressor orders cause more than one execution.  
2)  Algorithms submit more but smaller orders   
Assuming that the algorithms can monitor changes in the order book and react in real-time and 
given that they still get what they saw when their order is arriving at the market, algorithms look 
for advantageous limits in the order book and snap at the chance and execute the best bid or 
offer. As the top of the book most often is thin – as the most volume is just behind the best bid 
and offer – this results in more but smaller executions. Furthermore the smaller executions lead 
to less market impact than larger executions that would potentially hit more than one price level. 
For non-aggressor orders, Table 3 presents evidence that ATP non-aggressor orders (i.e. limit orders 
that are not immediately executable) are also smaller than their Non-ATP counterparts as it depicts the 
average order volumes and average order values (order volume times order limit). The surplus of Non-
ATP orders’ average value over ATP orders’ average value is 143.5% for all securities. The values for 
the individual instruments range from 40.6% (Linde) to 455.7% (Volkswagen). Please note that iceberg 
orders and their peaks have not been considered for the calculation of the averages.   
  
  ATP Non-Aggressor Orders  Non-ATP Non-Aggressor Orders 
   #  Share
Avg. 
Volume
Avg. 
Value (€)  #  Share
Avg. 
Volume 
Avg. 
Value (€) 
Avg. 
Value 
Surplus 
Adidas 37,007  53.9% 566 25,011 31,711 46.1%  1,104  48,854 95.3%
Allianz 119,618  51.2% 291 47,484 114,208 48.8%  566  92,271 94.3%
BASF 68,921  59.3% 468 44,842 47,308 40.7%  754  72,447 61.6%
Bayer 65,683  59.4% 643 36,201 44,877 40.6%  1,120  62,886 73.7%
BMW 41,761  51.5% 568 26,929 39,335 48.5%  1,087  51,566 91.5%
Commerzbank 47,947  48.1% 934 28,649 51,665 51.9%  1,532  47,062 64.3%
Continental 46,749  62.9% 241 23,903 27,564 37.1%  620  61,458 157.1%
Daimler 48,249  48.1% 321 34,043 52,152 51.9%  746  79,158 132.5%
Deutsche Bank  108,964  54.1% 488 45,729 92,584 45.9%  791  74,311 62.5%
Deutsche Börse  97,228  48.6% 803 59,373 102,636 51.4%  1,221  90,798 52.9%
Deutsche Post  23,812  60.2% 379 20,553 15,714 39.8%  803  45,553 121.6%
Deutsche Postbank  41,370  56.3% 1,392 29,818 32,094 43.7%  2,271  50,189 68.3%
Deutsche Telekom  43,692  54.8% 3,652 50,061 36,075 45.2%  6,247  85,648 71.1%
E.ON 108,008  54.7% 424 54,359 89,328 45.3%  733  93,872 72.7%
Fresenius Med. Care  45,735  71.1% 527 19,137 18,566 28.9%  1,208  43,908 129.4%
Henkel 31,483  55.5% 431 15,296 25,269 44.5%  793  28,052 83.4%
Hypo Real Estate  50,448  56.7% 450 19,920 38,451 43.3%  928  40,962 105.6%
Infineon 40,143  66.5% 2,523 27,996 20,232 33.5%  3,681  40,836 45.9%
Linde 55,312  68.2% 1,186 25,134 25,801 31.8%  1,665  35,329 40.6%
Lufthansa 56,682  62.7% 302 27,133 33,679 37.3%  743  66,842 146.3%
MAN 71,643  52.0% 240 28,685 66,079 48.0%  778  92,974 224.1%
Merck 31,709  51.6% 500 31,063 29,797 48.4%  1,015  63,028 102.9%
Metro 30,851  72.5% 293 26,189 11,719 27.5%  444  39,497 50.8%
Münchner Rück  87,952  46.2% 242 33,263 102,499 53.8%  630  86,497 160.0%
RWE 59,150  38.3% 473 42,123 95,325 61.7%  789  70,133 66.5%
SAP 88,309  53.9% 943 37,333 75,524 46.1%  1,452  57,548 54.1%
 Siemens 112,847  55.3% 544 53,282 91,121 44.7%  869  85,074 59.7%
ThyssenKrupp 64,648  66.3% 519 23,253 32,912 33.7%  900  40,428 73.9%
TUI 26,850  56.3% 924 18,627 20,839 43.7%  1,931  38,896 108.8%
Volkswagen 80,832  31.7% 265 47,027 174,075 68.3%  1,480  261,346 455.7%
Total 1,833,603  52.8% 648 37,447 1,639,139 47.2%  1,160  91,192 143.5%
Table 3.  Average volumes and values of submitted non-aggressor orders in continuous trading 
Concerning research question 1, the data reveals that Algorithmic Trading is a relevant part of 
technical events, actual executions as well as order submissions. Algorithms tend to use smaller order 
volumes both for aggressive as well as for non-aggressive orders than (human) Non-ATP counterparts.  
Research question 2: Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by 
Algorithmic Trading engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market 
movements and market information when algorithms execute orders aggressively? 
Research question 2 relates to the (aggressive) execution behavior of algorithms and is addressed in 
two dimensions: 2a) concerning the usage of order types by algorithms versus human traders and 2b) 
concerning the submitted limits in case of aggressive limit orders by algorithms versus human traders. 
2a) If ATP traders would be more aggressive one might assume that they will utilize market orders to 
a larger extent than Non-ATP traders. As Table 4 points out, this is not the case, as although there is a 
similar number of ATP and Non-ATP orders involved in continuous trading, only 6.2% of the market 
orders have been submitted by ATP users. A straight forward Chi-Square Test shows that the null-
hypothesis of equal likelihood for ATP and Non-ATP participants to either utilize limited orders (limit 
and iceberg orders) or market orders can be rejected at a p-value of 0.01, which reveals a highly 
significant difference. The vast majority of ATP submitted orders are limit orders as an aggressive 
strategy can be implemented with limit orders and a smart setting of the limits as well. Such a strategy 
is eased by speed and low latency to monitor market movements in real-time and to react with 
minimum delay – a prerequisite that can be matched by machines.    
 
ATP Non-ATP  Ordertype 
Occurrences Share Occurrences  Share 
Limit 2,145,968  53.9%  1,832,175  46.1% 
Market 3,042  6.2%  46,352  93.8% 
Iceberg 4,739  8.0%  54,137  92.0% 
Market-To-Limit 0  0.0%  587  100.0% 
Total 2,153,749  52.7%  1,933,251  47.3% 
Table 4.  Utilization of order types by ATP and Non-ATP traders in continuous trading 
2b) In the following the focus is laid on how algorithms set order limits when implementing an 
aggressive strategy. Based on the succession of order events in the dataset, the state of the order book 
has been reconstructed event-by-event for each single point of time in the observation period. The 
determined executions based on this order book reconstruction have been validated against actual 
executions reported in the dataset. The reconstruction of the order book enables to investigate order 
submissions relative to the best bid and offer limits (the spread) prevailing at the time of submission. 
Although ATP and Non-ATP exhibit a similar share of aggressive orders (ATP: 14.6%, Non-ATP: 
11.2%; see research question 1), the applied limits relative to current best bids and offers differ clearly 
(Table 5). 67.8% of all order submissions that exactly match the best bid or offer are ATP orders. 
Nearly two thirds of the other aggressive submissions are Non-ATP orders. For ATP orders, even 
85.1% of the aggressive orders are limited exactly to the best available limit in the order book. A Chi-
Square Test shows that the null-hypothesis of equal likelihood of ATP and Non-ATP orders to submit 
exact limit matches can be rejected at a p-value of 0.01, i.e. reveals a highly significant difference.  
 
  ATP  Non-ATP 
   Occurrences  Share  Occurrences Share 
Exact Limit Matches  270,132  67.8% 128,229 32.2%
Other Matches  47,219  34.8% 88,531 65.2%
Total Matches  317,351  59.4% 216,760 40.6%
Table 5.  Distribution of exact limit matches 
Further, 17.7% of aggressive ATP orders are also exactly matching the volume available at the best 
limit (Non-ATP: 7.9%). Out of all submissions that exactly match the opposite side’s limit and volume 
76.7% are ATP orders. For high-liquid securities, such as Siemens or E.ON, this proportion is even 
higher (92.1% respectively 91.9%). Referring to research question 2, these results indicate that ATP 
orders’ limits and volumes are based on a real-time monitoring of the market and are set based on 
latest market movements. 
Research question 3: Does Algorithmic Trading activity, i.e. do actual orders submitted by 
Algorithmic Trading engines, reflect their technical ability to monitor and exploit real-time market 
movements and market information when algorithms position non-aggressive orders in the order 
book? 
Research question 3 relates to the (non-aggressive) submission behavior and can be addressed in two 
dimensions: 3a) concerning the positioning of non-aggressive orders by algorithms versus human 
traders relative to the current best bids or best offers and 3b) concerning the adaptation of limits by 
algorithms versus human traders in case of changing best bids or best offers. 
3a) Table 6 points out the different positioning of non-aggressive ATP- and Non-ATP orders. Of the 
non-aggressive orders that improve the spread, 75.9% are ATP orders, while of the orders that do not 
affect the spread 62.5% are Non-ATP. A Chi-Square Test (null-hypothesis: equal likelihood of ATP 
and Non-ATP orders to improve the spread) can be rejected at a p-value of 0.01, i.e. again reveals a 
highly significant difference among ATP and Non-ATP orders. The different order positioning 
behavior can also be seen from the weighted-average absolute variation in cents by which orders 
narrow the spread. ATP orders improve the best limit on average by 1.38 cents while Non-ATP orders 
improve it by 1.95 cents, i.e. algorithms are able to position orders at the top of the book with a lower 
concession in terms of price improvement.    
 
 ATP  Non-ATP 
   Occurrences Share  Occurrences Share 
Spread Improvement  1.007.781 75,9% 320.496 24,1%
No Spread Improvement  830.350 37,5% 1.385.458 62,5%
Total 1.838.131   1.705.954  
Table 6.  Distribution of spread improvements 
3b) As shown above, ATP market participants limit the majority of their non-aggressive order in a 
way to be at the spread by either adding volume to the existing spread limit or setting a better limit. As 
these orders are positioned at the top of the book, i.e. they have a high likelihood of execution, it is of 
interest to investigate their further lifetime. The following table 7 depicts what happens to orders that 
are part of the spread when their lifetime ends. The absolute figures reveal that there are by far more 
ATP orders that end their lifetime being at the spread. As for table 7 the distribution of the termination 
reasons is in the focus, the percentages are calculated in relation all termination reasons at the spread 
for each ATP and Non-ATP. About two thirds of Non-ATP orders end their lifetime at the spread by 
getting executed, while about one third gets deleted. For ATP orders these ratios are nearly vice versa. 
63.2% of the ATP orders that end their lifetime being part of the spread are deleted. Again, the Chi-
 Square Test (null-hypothesis: equal likelihood of ATP and Non-ATP orders to be terminated by 
execution; p-value of 0.01) reveals a highly significant difference between ATP and Non-ATP orders. 
The third and sixth column (table 7) lists the average time in milliseconds that the orders were 
continuously part of the spread before termination. The average survival times for orders terminated 
by execution are similar. This meets the expectation, as for executions the survival time is determined 
by other (aggressive) orders and therefore can not be influenced by the order positioned at the spread. 
However, for deleted Non-ATP orders the survival time is nearly twice the one for deleted ATP 
orders. 63.2% of ATP orders are deleted on average 6.529 seconds after becoming part of the spread. 
At a first glance it seems as if ATP users initially submit orders at the spread and then get cold feet 
and delete their orders to avoid execution. But what seems to be a deletion is actually a modification. 
As within the Xetra market model only a reduction of order volume does not affect price-time priority 
while all other modifications are mapped to a deletion event and a subsequent submission event for the 
‘new’ modified order. For 26.9% of the ATP orders deleted at the spread there is an ATP submission 
event of a new order in the same instrument at exactly the same timestamp, with the same direction 
(buy or sell) and exactly the same volume (Non-ATP: 23.2%). If the restrictions are relaxed (up to 1 
second delay, +/-5% volume), there is a corresponding submission event for 40.2% of the ATP 
deletions (Non-ATP: 33.4%) out of which 115,331 again improve the spread (Non-ATP: 16,822). This 
indicates that ATP traders want their orders to be at the top of the book. Therefore, they emulate 
pegging orders at their front end (an order type where the limit tracks the best bid or offer and moves 
with the market) as this order type – contrary to other markets – is not provided by the Xetra back-end.  
  
 ATP  Non-ATP 
  Events  Distribution  Avg. Survival time (ms)  Events  Distribution  Avg. Survival time (ms) 
Execution 293,142  36.8%  17,927  184,009 64.9%  20,072 
Deletion 503,650  63.2%  6,519  99,674  35.1%  11,731 
Total 796,792  100.0%  10,716  283,410 100.0%  17,141 
Table 7.  Survival time and termination reason for orders at the spread 
To sum up the data analyzed concerning research question 3, the results indicate that ATP traders are 
more aware of the current spread, as they more often reflect the current best bid or ask when limiting 
their orders, and that their orders about three times more often narrow the current spread. Furthermore, 
they control their orders relative to the current market situation and delete and reinsert their orders 
based on changes in the current spread more extensively than Non-ATP traders. 
5  CONCLUSION 
The detailed implementations of Algorithmic Trading systems are not published as these constitute 
important intellectual property rights of investment firms and are a key component of their business 
models both for proprietary trading and when providing algorithms to customers (regularly as a black 
box).  Therefore, only little is known about how Algorithmic Trading engines schedule their trading 
and adapt to current market movements. Based on a unique dataset from a market operator that 
includes a tag enabling to distinguish Algorithmic Trading engines and human traders, the results 
show that the submission and deletion behavior of those systems (statistically) significantly differs 
from other market participants’. Evidence has been presented that Algorithmic Trading systems 
submit orders that are noticeably smaller. Additionally they show the ability to monitor their orders 
and modify them to be at the top of the book. Applying Chi-Square Tests shows that Algorithmic 
Trading behavior is fundamentally different to human trading concerning the use of order types, the 
positioning of limits in case of executions and submissions as well as their modification/deletion 
behavior. These results let us conclude that Algorithmic Trading systems capitalize on their 
advantageous ability to process high-speed data feeds and react instantaneously to market movements 
by submitting corresponding orders or modifying existing ones.  
 Future research based on the dataset will both investigate order submission strategies in auctions and 
the contribution of Algorithmic Trading engines to overall market liquidity. This contributes not only 
to the understanding of the algorithmic implementations but also to market design and market 
surveillance issues. Furthermore, the understanding of algorithmic behavior enables to identify 
potential functional or technical bottlenecks especially in peak load periods. 
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